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Reliability and the Interests of
Justice: Interpreting the Military





Vice President Dick Cheney recently agreed with a radio talk
show host that dunking a suspected terrorist in water to extract
information was a "no-brainer."' Cheney hastened to note that
the United States does not torture, later adding that he was not
referring to waterboarding2 as a method of interrogation because
*Professor of Law, Roger Williams University. I have benefited from
conversations with Mike Ritz, a former United States Army interrogator, who
regularly speaks about interrogation techniques and runs Team Delta, an
organization that offers training on interrogation issues.
**Laura Corbin is a Captain in the United States Army Reserve working in
the field of military intelligence. The views expressed in this article are not
the views of the United States Army and do not reflect the author's personal
knowledge or experience as a military officer.
1. See Neil A. Lewis, Furor Over Cheney Remark on Tactics for Terror
Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2006, at A8. For more graphic background
information on interrogation techniques, see Team Delta, We Can Make You
Talk, at http://teamdelta.net/HistoryChannel.htm.
2. Waterboarding is a technique that simulates drowning by covering
the suspect's mouth and pouring water over his face making it difficult for
the suspect to breathe. Mike Ritz participates in a demonstration of the
waterboarding technique at http://www.current.tv/pods/controversy/PD04399.
See David Johnston and James Risen, The Interrogations; Aides Say Memo
Backed Coercion Already in Use, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2004, at sec.1. The
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he does not discuss those techniques publicly. 3 Despite these
caveats, the Vice President's comments suggest that he does not
view waterboarding as torture. Others with more experience
might disagree with his assessment. 4 The Vice President was,
however, correct that definitions matter, particularly under the
Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA), which governs
proceedings involving suspected terrorists detained at
Guantanamo Bay. The MCA would permit a judge to allow
statements obtained by coercion short of torture under certain
circumstances. 5 The better approach, however, is to interpret the
MCA and other sources of law to exclude such evidence.
Trends in domestic and international law run against the
MCA's distinction between torture and other forms of coercion.
The Supreme Court has ruled that the Constitution bars evidence
obtained through coercion from use in criminal trials.6
International law has also eroded this distinction. 7 Indeed, even
the MCA does not distinguish between torture and coercion in
ongoing interrogations, but maintains the distinction only for
interrogations that preceded the effective date of legislation. 8
Moreover, the MCA's distinction hinges on a finding that evidence
from those interrogations is reliable and serves the interests of
technique reportedly was used on Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, mastermind of
the attacks on September 11, 2001. See id.
3. See Lewis, supra note 1, at A8.
4. Waterboarding is now explicitly prohibited as an interrogation
technique in the Army field manual for interrogations. See FM 2-22.3 (FM
34-52), 5-75, HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR OPERATIONS, (2006),
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm 2-22-3.pdf.
5. 10 U.S.C.A. § 948r(c), (d) (West Supp. 2007). See infra notes 19-20 on
specific MCA provisions; see also Peter Margulies, The Military Commissions
Act, Coerced Confessions, and the Role of the Courts, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS
(2006), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=954415 (hereinafter The
MCA and Coerced Confessions); cf. Peter Margulies, Beyond Absolutism:
Legal Institutions in the War on Terror, 60 U. MIAMI L. REV. 309, 311-18
(2006) (discussing legal, philosophical, and policy issues regarding torture).
6. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434 (2000).
7. See infra notes 26 and 29.
8. The MCA bars evidence from interrogations on or after December 30,
2005 that involved "treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth,
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States." See
10 U.S.C.A. § 948r(c), (d) (West Supp. 2007); see also THE MANUAL FOR
MILITARY COMMISSIONS, Rule 304(b)(4), (Jan. 18, 2007), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/the%20
Manual%20for%2OMilitary%2OCommissions.pdf.
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justice.9
This Article argues that the conditions on admissibility
imposed by the MCA give a court ample interpretive space to
exclude evidence obtained through coercion. Nevertheless, the
exigencies of apprehending terror suspects abroad and seeking to
prevent new attacks require some flexibility in the scope and
context of questioning. For example, government officials should
not have to provide Miranda warnings to suspects apprehended
abroad and charged in military commissions. Moreover, officials
seeking information about pending attacks from a suspect should
have a reasonable but not open-ended period of time to question a
detainee outside the presence of a lawyer. 10 A court should,
however, exclude evidence obtained through specific coercive
techniques, including hooding, temperature extremes, and stress
positions."I This pragmatic approach provides safeguards against
government overreaching while also facilitating the prevention of
harm to the public.
This Article is in seven parts. Part I explains the impetus for
the MCA and the evidentiary standard relevant to this discussion.
Part II explores the sociology of interrogation and its
uncertainties. Part III examines case law from Britain and Israel
that provides useful examples of where international courts have
distinguished torture and unlawful coercion and the definition of
torture in the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment. Part IV surveys the Anglo-
American legal traditions eschewing torture. Part V describes
how the United States Supreme Court has applied the protections
of the Constitution abroad and how that precedent may be read to
extend constitutional protections to detainees at Guantanamo
Bay. Part VI considers how the MCA itself may be interpreted to
exclude evidence obtained by coercive interrogations, especially in
light of the prohibition of cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment codified in the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005.
9. 10 U.S.C.A. § 948r(c) (West Supp. 2007).
10. Current case law recognizes that it may be impracticable to require
the immediate provision of a lawyer for a defendant in a civilian criminal
court who has been apprehended abroad, where lawyers may not be readily
available on-site. See United States v. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d 168, 188
(D.N.Y. 2001).
11. See infra note 29 (discussing interrogation tactics used by the British
government on suspected IRA terrorists).
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Finally, this Article suggests that courts may exercise their
authority under the Constitution to exclude evidence obtained by
coercion even if this evidence was admissible under the MCA.
MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT OF 2006
The MCA allows for the trial by military commission of
unlawful enemy combatants held at the United States Naval Base
at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Congress passed the MCA in October,
2006, in response to the Supreme Court's ruling in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, decided four months earlier.' 2 Hamdan held, in part,
that military commissions previously created by President Bush to
try "unlawful enemy combatants" were illegal because their
procedures did not comply with provisions of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ) and the Geneva Conventions. 13 Hamdan
also declared that the United States must provide the minimum
protections under Common Article 3 to enemy combatants by
trying them in a "regularly constituted court affording all the
judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by
civilized peoples.' 4 Congress countered Hamdan by establishing
procedures for military commissions, specifically removing courts'
habeas corpus jurisdiction over enemy combatant detainees,
exempting the commissions from certain UCMJ requirements,
declaring the commissions to be "regularly constituted court[s]"
with the "judicial guarantees" called for under Common Article 3,
and withdrawing the Geneva Conventions as a source of right at
trial. 15
The MCA also addresses the admissibility of evidence
obtained through coercion. First, the MCA prohibits the
admission of evidence obtained by torture, defined as "an act
specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or
suffering."'16 The act then establishes two separate tests where
12. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). This subsection is based on The MCA and
Coerced Confessions, supra note 5.
13. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2759.
14. Id. at 2796 (citing 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3320 (Art. 3, 1(d)).
15. 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 948b(f),(g) and 950j(b) (West Supp. 2007).
16. Id. at § 948r(b); see also THE MANUAL FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS,
Rule 304(b)(3), supra note 8. The manual further defines severe mental pain
or suffering as
prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from: (a) the
754 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 12:750
there is no torture but where the degree of coercion is disputed.
The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA), which proscribed
"cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment," as
defined by reference to the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments, is the dividing line between the two approaches. 17
If the statement at issue was given after passage of the DTA,
the judge may allow the statement if she finds it is reliable and
sufficiently probative under the "totality of the circumstances," if
the evidence serves the interests of justice, and if the statement
was not the product of "cruel, inhuman, or degrading"
interrogation methods.' 8 If the statement was obtained prior to
the DTA, the judge is not required to consider the third prong of
the test. 19 The coercive character of the interrogation methods
may be overlooked, so long as those methods fall short of torture.20
THE UNCERTAINTIES OF INTERROGATION
Evidence obtained by coercion has consequences that
intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain
or suffering; (b) the administration or application, or threatened
administration or application, of mind-altering substances or other
procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the
personality; (c) the threat of imminent death; or (d) the threat that
another person will imminently be subjected to death, severe
physical pain or suffering, or the administration or application of
mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt
profoundly the senses or personality.
THE MANUAL FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS, supra note 8, at IV-9. This mirrors
the language of Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which the United States
ratified in 1994.
17. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-163, §§ 1401 to
1406, 119 Stat. 3474 (2005).
18. 10 U.S.C.A. § 948r(d) (West Supp. 2007); see also Detainee Treatment
Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 1403, 119 Stat. 347 (2005) (provision of
the DTA popularly known as the McCain Amendment declaring that "no
individual in the custody or under the physical control of the United States
Government, regardless of nationality or physical location, shall be subject to
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment").
19. 10 U.S.C.A. § 948r(c) (West Supp. 2007).
20. Id. Further, it is unclear whether a detainee will be able to present
the evidence of coercion necessary to prove his case; the proof would
necessarily depend on the accuracy or availability of government records
pertaining to the interrogation methods used. See id. at §§ 949d(f) and
949j(c) (describing the restrictions that control access to classified
information).
2007] TO DETER COERCIVE INTERROGATIONS 755
Congress may have overlooked in passing the MCA. First, even
assuming that coercion is sometimes justified, interrogators'
imperfect knowledge will result in coercion that is either futile or
unnecessary. 21 Second, for the same reason, information obtained
through torture is often unreliable. Third, torture and coercion
create a culture among interrogators that is destructive and
contagious. 22
Utilitarians might argue that torture or other forms of
coercion are justifiable to prevent a greater evil. Consider the
"ticking bomb" scenario, in which government officials need
information immediately to prevent catastrophe.23  Terrorists
have proved capable of catastrophic harm at Oklahoma City and
on September 11, 2001. On this view, if the government had
apprehended Mohammed Atta, leader of the 9/11 hijackers, prior
to September 11, torture would have been a necessary evil to
prevent the harm that resulted from the attacks. Unfortunately,
although the threat of a catastrophic harm can reasonably be
imagined, the remainder of the "ticking bomb" equation is
frequently unknowable.
The ticking bomb scenario is most compelling ex post - that
is, after the fact of catastrophe. However, officials must make the
decision to torture ex ante - before the fact. Before the fact, an
official typically cannot determine whether torture or other
coercive practices are necessary because the official does not know
what information the subject possesses. The subject may be a
"false positive," whom the government picked up mistakenly.
Alternatively, the subject may have some knowledge, but not the
information the government needs. The interrogator with
imperfect information may, however, misinterpret the subject's
claims of ignorance. Rather than view the subject as truthful, the
21. For information on professional interrogation and the limits of
empirical information on the topic, see generally Intelligence Science Board,
Educing Information: Interrogation: Science and Art, (Dec. 2006) at
http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/educing.pdf.
22. See Andrew Sullivan, The Abolition of Torture, in TORTURE: A
COLLECTION 317, 323 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004) (discussing the spread of a
culture of coercion to Abu Ghraib Prison).
23. See, e.g., TORTURE: A COLLECTION 183, 229, 257, 291, 307 (Sanford
Levinson ed., 2004) (Essays by Miriam Gur-Arye, Oren Gross, Alan
Dershowitz, Richard A. Posner, and Charles Krauthammer all address the
"ticking bomb.").
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interrogator may assume that the subject is exhibiting resistance.
This may lead the interrogator to apply more coercive tactics. Out
of desperation, the subject may give the interrogator the story the
subject thinks the interrogator wants to hear.
The introduction of such flawed statements into evidence in
legal proceedings also erodes the truth-seeking function of
tribunals. Once the government introduces tainted evidence, it
has a stake in covering up information that might lead an
adversary or the court to doubt the evidence's reliability.
Deception is piled upon deception, to avoid embarrassment or
defeat. The ethics of government lawyers and the integrity of the
tribunal take a beating.24
Finally, torture is contagious. As Mark Twain observed, "[t]o
a man with a hammer, everything looks like a nail. ' 25 Once
coercive tactics are permitted, they take on a viral quality.26 From
a last resort, coercion can quickly become the interrogator's tool of
choice, even when other methods are more effective.27
24. Cf. PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR 290-91, 299-300 (1983) (discussing
lack of candor of government attorneys in Korematsu litigation regarding
legality of Japanese-American internment during World War II).
25. See Alan Dershowitz, Tortured Reasoning, in TORTURE: A
COLLECTION, supra note 23, at 257, 271.
26. See Amos N. Guiora & Erin M. Page, The Unholy Trinity:
Intelligence, Interrogation and Torture, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 427, 434
(stating that petitions filed after the Landau Commission approved the use of
coercive methods on Palestinian terror suspects showed "virtually every
Palestinian detainee" was subject to duress regardless of the presence of a
"ticking bomb" scenario) (citing B'Tselem, The Israeli Information Center for
Human Rights in the Occupied Territories Report (report estimates 85% of
Palestinians interrogated were subject to interrogation techniques amounting
to torture), available at http://www.btselem.org/English/Publicationsl
Summaries/199802_RoutineTorture.asp); see also David Luban, Liberalism,
Torture and the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1446-47 (stating that
prior to a 1999 Israeli Supreme Court decision calling for a halt to coercive
interrogation techniques, two-thirds of Palestinians were interrogated using
coercive methods) (citing Mark Bowden, The Dark Art of Interrogation,
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 2003, at 51, 65-68).
27. Even when high value terrorists, those who presumably know about
al-Qaida plots in general, have been interrogated using "alternative" coercive
methods such as waterboarding, the information gleaned has been of
questionable value. See Mark Mazzetti, Threats and Responses: -The
Intelligence Agency; Questions Raised About Bush's Primary Claims in
Defense of Secret Detention System, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2006, at A24. After
President Bush cited a chain of arrests and disrupted plots sparked by
information from CIA interrogations, the New York Times asserted some of
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INTERNATIONAL EXAMPLES OF TORTURE AND CRUEL, INHUMAN, OR
DEGRADING TREATMENT
Because the MCA explicitly .excludes evidence obtained
through torture while permitting some evidence obtained through
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, discussion of the Act
necessarily requires an examination of which interrogation
methods might amount to torture or coercion. International case
law arising in Britain and Israel supplies useful examples of
coercion. Both democracies have faced the threat of terrorism on
home soil and have employed coercive interrogation techniques to
combat it.
In 1999, the Supreme Court of Israel held that interrogation
techniques used by the Israeli General Security Services to
interrogate Palestinian terrorism suspects were illegal and
coercive. 28 These techniques included shaking, stress positions
such as "frog" crouching on the tips of one's toes, covering the head
with a cloth sack (hooding), interrogation while handcuffed in a
painful position to a low chair tilted forward, and the playing of
"powerfully loud music. '2 9  The court also found that sleep
deprivation was reasonable if merely a side effect of interrogation
rather than an intentional tool meant to break the suspect. 30
Similarly, in a case brought before the European Court of
Human Rights, the Republic of Ireland claimed interrogation
techniques used by British security forces against IRA terrorism
the key information cited was known prior to the interrogations. Id.
Further, some information obtained by coercive methods has been proven
false. Id. After being subjected to harsh interrogation techniques, Ibn al-
Shaykh al-Libbi reportedly told interrogators that al-Qaida had been trained
to use chemical and biological weapons in Iraq. Id. This information was
later used to justify the United States decision to go to war in Iraq, but al-
Libbi reportedly fabricated his statements to avoid further ill treatment. Id.;
see also Brian Ross & Richard Esposito, CIA's Harsh Interrogation
Techniques Described, ABC NEWS, Nov. 18, 2005, http://abcnews.go.com/WNT
/Investigation/story?id=1322866.
28. Supreme Court of Israel: Judgment Concerning the Legality of the
General Security Service's Interrogation Methods, 38 I.L.M. 1471, 1482-84
(1999) (alternative cite at HCJ 5100/94 Public Committee Against Torture in
Israel v. The State of Israel 1, 24-27 (1999), at
http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files-eng/94/000/051/aO9/94051000.aO9.pdf).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1484.
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suspects amounted to torture. 31 The European Court held that
"the five techniques" amounted to inhuman and degrading
treatment under the European Convention on Human Rights. 32
The five techniques included a stress position known as "wall
standing," in which the suspect stood spread-eagle against a wall
balancing his weight on his toes and fingertips; hooding; sleep and
food deprivation; and subjection to a continuous hissing noise. 33
In determining that these methods did not rise to the level of
torture, the committee put substantial weight on "suffering of the
particular intensity and cruelty implied by the word torture as so
understood."34
The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman,
or Degrading Treatment (CAT), which the United States ratified
in 1994, defines torture as "severe pain or suffering whether
physical or mental" that is intentionally inflicted by a state.35 The
CAT further states that "no exceptional circumstances
whatsoever" may justify torture. 36 Cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment, however, is left undefined and is not subject to the
categorical prohibition. Instead nations simply agree to
"undertake to prevent" such treatment. 37
As a condition to ratifying the CAT the United States limited
the definition of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment to that
treatment already unconstitutional under the Fifth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments. 38 The now infamous and repudiated
31. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 25 (1978).
32. Id. at 80.
33. Id. at 59.
34. Id. at 80. Fionnuala Ni Aolain argues that the methods found to fall
short of torture in this case would likely be considered torture under the
European Court's standards today. See Fionnuala Ni Aolain, The European
Convention on Human Rights and Its Prohibition on Torture, in TORTURE: A
COLLECTION, 213, 216-17 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004) (stating Ireland v.
United Kingdom was a politically sensitive decision and subsequent cases
have called into question whether the European Court will continue to avoid
finding a participating government has used torture).
35. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, art. 1, 1, 39 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984), available at
http://www.un.org then documents, general assembly, resolutions, 39th-1984,
AfRES/39/46.
36. Id. at pt. 1, art. 2, 2.
37. Id. at pt. 1, art. 16, 1.
38. SEN. EXEC. REP. No. 101-30, at 8 (1990).
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Torture Memos-which suggested, among other refinements, that
pain inflicted during interrogation which fell short of that causing
organ failure was permissible to protect the national security-
were rejected as an attempt to redefine torture under the CAT.39
The Department of Justice later said it did not intend to adhere to
the memo's suggested definition of torture and Congress passed
the DTA, extending the reach of the torture and coercion
standards ratified in the CAT.40 Moreover, the tradition of Anglo-
American courts is hostile to statements obtained by torture or
coercion.
UNITED STATES LEGAL TRADITION - COERCIVE INTERROGATIONS
Coercive interrogations corrode the reliability of the
statements obtained and therefore preclude its admissibility when
viewed through the lens of historical judicial skepticism and
democratic values. 41 The permissive evidentiary standard of the
MCA allows judges to reject coerced statements based on Anglo-
American traditions that dubiously view confessions not
"voluntarily and freely made. '42
39. Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Asst. Atty. General to
James B. Comey, Deputy Atty. General, Legal Standards Applicable Under
18 U.S.C. 2340-2340A, Dec. 30, 2004,
http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/18usc23402340a2.htm.
40. Id.; see also Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Spells Out New Definition Curbing
Torture, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2005, at Al.
41. The notion that confessions born of coercion are "inherently
untrustworthy" is rooted in British and American law. Dickerson v. United
States, 530 U.S. 428, 433 (2000) (citing King v. Rudd, 168 Eng. Rep. 160, 161,
164 (K.B. 1783) (Lord Mansfield). But the true tension in the balance
between national security and democratic values in the rule of law is
presented when the veracity of statements obtained by torture or coercion is
corroborated by other evidence. The Supreme Court has invoked the
doctrines of inevitable discovery and independent source to allow evidence
that is the fruit of a constitutional violation. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S.
431, 447 (1984); see also Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537, 544-45
(1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The independent source exception, like the
inevitable discovery exception, is primarily based on a practical view that
under certain circumstances the beneficial deterrent effect that exclusion will
have on future constitutional violations is too slight to justify the social cost
of excluding probative evidence from a criminal trial."). Where circumstances
permit, these doctrines should give courts leeway to admit evidence that
would otherwise be the fruit of a coercive interrogation even when the coerced
statements themselves are excluded.
42. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 544 (1897).
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Judicial distrust of coerced statements is deeply rooted. The
classic elucidation of this distrust derives from an 18th century
English case that praised voluntary confessions born of a guilty
conscience but declared, ".. -a confession forced from the mind by
the flattery of hope, or by the torture of fear, comes in so
questionable a shape ... that no credit ought to be given to it..
.."43 The framers undoubtedly were aware of the dangers of
coerced confessions and the courts' entrenched skepticism of such
statements while drafting both the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights.44
Our Fifth Amendment jurisprudence, protecting against
compelled self-incrimination and requiring due process, and the
later adopted Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause
therefore embody the prohibition against coercion. Coercion cases
have recognized two underlying rationales for the prohibition: the
actual unreliability of the confession and the probability that the
confession is unreliable because of undue government pressure. 45
Because precedent has evolved to emphasize unconstitutional
43. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 433 (citing King v. Warickshall, 168 Eng. Rep.
234, 235 (K.B. 1783). Dickerson went on to hold that Miranda warnings were
a constitutional requirement that could not be modified by Congressional
statute. Miranda, itself, was an expression of judicial skepticism over the
coercive nature of custodial interrogations. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 444 (1966). This Article argues that, while every constitutional right of
a citizen, in particular the requirement of Miranda warnings, may not
practically be extended to a detainee, the fundamental right to have
statements born of physical or extreme psychological coercion excluded from
a criminal prosecution should inhere in all those made to participate in our
adversarial process. Miranda, however, is still useful to demonstrate the
importance and long reach of. constitutional protections in our criminal
justice system. The fact of custodial interrogation should continue to inform
the MCA's "totality of the circumstances" test for coercion, but should not be
a per se bar to admission.
44. Bram, 168 U.S. 532 at 548 ("The well-settled nature of the rule in
England at the time of the adoption of the constitution and of the fifth
amendment, and the intimate knowledge had by the framers of the principles
of civil liberty which had become a part of the common law, aptly explain the
conciseness of the language of that amendment."). The rule in England
referred to in Bram was broad, and focused on the confessor's state of mind
no matter the conduct that led to the confession. The modern rule has been
narrowed to focus exclusively on state conduct leading to the confession. See
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 165-67 (1986).
45. Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards
Against Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 105, 112
(1997).
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coercive state action as the primary indication of an unreliable
confession, examples of improper government tactics both before
and after conviction will be informative.46
An October 2006 report to Congress on the implications of the
McCain Amendment's prohibition of "cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment," listed the following as
unconstitutional violations in United States criminal cases:
"handcuffing an individual to a hitching post in a standing
position for an extended period of time. . . maintaining
temperatures and ventilation systems in detention facilities that
fail to meet reasonable levels of comfort; and prolonged
interrogation over an unreasonably extended period of time,
including interrogation of a duration that might not seem
unreasonable in a vacuum, but becomes such when evaluated in
the totality of the circumstances. '47 Confessions provoked by an
offer of protection from threats of violence from other prisoners
would also be prohibited. 48
While it is not clear that these criminal precedents will apply
strictly to find "cruel, unusual or degrading treatment" of
detainees in the ongoing "War on Terror," courts should apply
these precedents to do so. Unlike prophylactic warnings and the
generally coercive environment of custodial interrogation, tactics
that produce physical and mental pain are affirmatively coercive
and pose a threat to the credibility of both the statements and the
tribunal that uses them to prosecute.
46. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 485 (1972) (citing Rogers v. Richmond,
365 U.S. 534, 540-541 (1961) ("The use of coerced confessions, whether true
or false, is forbidden because the method used to extract them offends
constitutional principles.").
47. Michael John Garcia, Interrogation of Detainees: Overview of the
McCain Amendment, CRS Report for Congress, 5 (Jan. 24, 2006) (citing Hope
v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963);
Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S.
519 (1968); Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966); Leyra v. Denno, 347
U.S. 556 (1954); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966); Ashdown v.
Utah, 357 U.S. 426 (1958); Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir.
2004)), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp.crs/intel/RS22312.pdf.
48. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991) (upholding an Arizona
judgment that a child murderer's confession was coerced under the totality of
the circumstances when, under fear for of physical violence from other
prisoners he was promised protection from the prison population in return for
his murder confession).
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Judges have been guardians of the integrity of the judicial
process and have refused to admit evidence illegally or
unconstitutionally procured for fear of tainting the integrity of the
courts. As Justice Frankfurter so aptly declared in McNabb v.
United States, "the history of liberty has largely been the history
of observance of procedural safeguards. ''49 While terrorism has
had deadly consequence for Americans - the bombing of the USS
Cole and the United States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania,
and the attack on September 11, 2001 - a double standard in
prosecuting those suspected of supporting or engaging in
terrorism threatens notions of liberty at the core of our identity at
home and abroad.
Moreover, these coercive tactics have an impact beyond the
courtroom. Perceived tolerance of coercive tactics from the highest
members of the executive to the soldier on the ground is arguably
what led to the abuses at Abu Ghraib and to the felt need for the
McCain Amendment's prohibition of "cruel, inhuman, and
degrading treatment" now incorporated into the evidence rules of
the MCA. 50  Although the MCA's application of the "cruel"
treatment prohibition from December 30, 2005 onward would
seem to deter any ongoing or future coercive interrogation tactics
since those tactics will no longer produce admissible evidence, the
sanctioning of prior coercive techniques implicit in the MCA's
bifurcated rule continues the harm inflicted on the detainee and
supports the interrogator's justification for her techniques,
ultimately undermining the prohibition.51
49. McNabb v. U.S., 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943). In exercising its
supervisory administrative authority over federal courts, the Supreme Court
held that confessions secured by federal law enforcement officers must be
excluded from the defendant's murder trial because of the circumstances
under which the suspects were held and interrogated. Id. The Court
acknowledged Constitutional Due Process claims might exist, but declined to
reach the constitutional issue. Id.
50. 152 CONG. REC. S10,250 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2006) (statement of Sen.
Graham) ("Abu Ghraib was about policies that cut legal corners, that
migrated from one side of the Government to the other, that got everybody
involved confused as to what you could and could not do.").
51. The MCA's amendment of the War Crimes Act (WCA) also threatens
to undermine deterrence of some coercive interrogation. The MCA amends
the WCA, defining nine offenses considered "grave breaches" of the Geneva
Conventions Common article 3 and punishable under the WCA. Military
Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 6(b)(1)(B) (2006). The MCA
also grants the President power to define conduct and promulgate regulations
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The Supreme Court itself observed that the prohibition on
coercion went beyond the unreliability of involuntary confessions,
citing the "strongly felt attitude of our society that important
human values are sacrificed where an agency of the government..
.wrings a confession out of an accused against his will." 52 The
Court further acknowledged "the deep-rooted feeling that the
police must obey the law while enforcing the law; that in the end
life and liberty can be as much endangered from illegal methods
used to convict those thought to be criminals as from the actual
criminals themselves. '53
The Court's warning reminds us that there are likely to be
innocent people held among the true terrorists. This is especially
true in the war on terror, where it is difficult to sort civilians from
enemy combatants and where innocents 54 are turned in as
terrorists for a bounty.55 The burden that our prosecution of this
for actions that fall outside the enumerated "grave breaches." Id. at §
6(a)(3)(A). The enumerated offenses include torture, intentional infliction of
"serious bodily injury," and cruel and inhuman treatment, but not degrading
treatment. Id. at § 6(b)(1)(B). Cruel and inhuman treatment is defined as an
act "intended to inflict severe or serious physical or mental pain or suffering"
without reference to the constitutional standard adopted in the CAT and
DTA. Id. This gap between what is a punishable offense under the WCA and
impermissible conduct toward detainees under the DTA leaves a grey zone
where the interrogator is forbidden to use cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment as constitutionally defined but only faces criminal punishment
under the WCA for conduct that constitutes a lower standard: a "grave
breach." See John Duberstein, Excluding Torture: A Comparison of the
British and American Approaches to Evidence Obtained by Third Party
Torture, 32 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 159, 177-78 (2006).
52. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 386 (1964) (citing Blackburn v.
Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206-07 (1960)).
53. Id. (citing Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1959)).
54. John Yoo, a professor at Berkeley's Boalt Law School and a former
Justice Department lawyer involved in drafting at least one of the repudiated
Torture Memos, recently criticized focusing on the great risk of detaining the
innocent, because the risk of harm from releasing a truly guilty terrorist is
potentially a greater harm to society. Further, he argued, the balance of risk
should ultimately be left to the political branches which are responsible for
the conduct of war. John Yoo, The Military Commissions Act Restored the
President's Proper Command over the War on Terror, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 5,
2007, at 44-45. Yoo's argument soundly describes the dilemma but ignores
the fundamental presumption of innocence and the judiciary's professional
responsibility to preserve the integrity of the courts. Further, the logical
extension of Yoo's argument would exact a heavy toll on the innocent based
primarily on an indefinite harm.
55. Mark Denbeaux, et al., Report on Guantanamo Detainees: A Profile of
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war places on the shoulders of those who are innocent should be
tempered by a fair judicial process that refuses evidence obtained
through coercion without regard to the date that coercion took
place.
HOW THE COURT HAS APPLIED CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS ABROAD
A benchmark for what amounts to coercion can be found in
our legal traditions and in case law that has interpreted the Fifth,
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.5 6  However, the Supreme
Court has refused to apply the guarantees of the Constitution
abroad with the same force with which they are applied at home.
Since the enactment of the McCain Amendment to the DTA,
which prohibits "cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment" as defined by the Fifth,, Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments regardless of the nationality or location of the
detainee, it appears that at least some protections now apply
beyond our borders without regard to citizenship. 57
Current protections extended by the amendment, however, do
not resolve the question of whether detainees already possessed
fundamental constitutional rights before the amendment was
enacted, therefore protecting their interests in a trial free of
evidence derived from coercive interrogations which took place
before the DTA. At a minimum, the standard governing the
admissibility of evidence obtained by agents of a foreign
government should ..represent the floor, by which coercive
statements elicited by agents of the United States government are
judged. When considering the admissibility in United States
courts of evidence obtained by foreign governments, courts have
applied the "shock the conscience"' test, 'first articulated in Rochin
517 Detainees through Analysis of Department of Defense* Data, available at
http://law.shu.edu/news/guantanamo-report-final_2_08_06.pdf. Among the
report's conclusions, the authors state "[o]nly [five percent] of the detainees
were captured by United States forces. [Eighty-six percent] of the detainees
were arrested by either Pakistan or the Northern Alliance and turned over to
United States custody." Id.
56. U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. at amend. VII; id. at amend. XIV, § 1.
57. See Garcia, supra note 47, at 4. Garcia also cautions that the
prohibition of "cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment" may
continue to defy strict adherence to constitutional precedent within the
United States because of the inherent difficulty of comparing criminal
interrogations to military interrogations prosecuting the "War on Terror."
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v. California.58 The "shock the conscience" test, when applied to
foreign governments, has been interpreted to mean "appalling
abuses, such as torture" which violate "fundamental international
norms of decency. '59
The idea that non-citizens with no presence in the United
States might have the protection of the fundamental rights of our
Constitution is a debate between pragmatic concerns and
democratic ideals. Justice Black with the support of two other
dissenters opined in Johnson v. Eisentrager, "[c]onquest by the
United States, unlike conquest by many other nations, does not
mean tyranny... Our constitutional principles are such that their
mandate of equal justice under law should be applied as well
when we occupy lands across the sea as when our flag flew only
over thirteen colonies. Our nation proclaims a belief in the dignity
of human beings as such, no matter what their nationality or
where they happen to live. '60 But Justice Jackson, writing for the
majority, stood firm that the Fifth Amendment stops short of
spreading its protection "over alien enemies anywhere in the
world engaged in hostilities against us" given the text of the
amendment and the knowledge that our own military members
are subject to military trials.61
Arguments advanced for the extension of fundamental
constitutional rights to detainees - generally foreign citizens
captured in foreign lands and held outside the "territory" of the
United States - have been unavailing. Eisentrager has become
58. 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (forced pumping of a drug suspect's stomach to
obtain evidence violated the suspect's Fourteenth Amendment due process
rights).
59. See United States v. Angulo-Hurtado, 165 F. Supp. 2d 1363, 1370 n.7
(N.D.Ga. 2001) (citing United States v. Mitro, 880 F.2d 1480, 1483-84 (1st
Cir. 1989) ("conduct of foreign government in refusing to allow defendant to
inspect wiretap application and affidavit did not shock the conscience so as to
require exclusion; to invoke 'very limited' exception, defendant must show
not only violation of his due process rights but of 'fundamental international
norms of decency"').
60. 339 U.S. 763, 798 (1950).
61. Id. at 782-83. This debate occurred in the context of a habeas
petition. The Fifth Amendment issue implicated by this Article is perhaps
different since military members retain the right to trials free from evidence
elicited from coercive interrogation. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10
U.S.C. § 831 (1956).
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the executive trump card. 62 The Eisentrager Court rejected the
habeas petition of a German soldier tried by military commission
for supplying intelligence about United States military
movements to the Japanese after Germany's surrender in World
War 11.63 The Court held that "the Constitution does not confer a
right of personal security or an immunity from military trial and
punishment upon an alien enemy engaged in the hostile service of
a government at war with the United States. '6 4 The Supreme
Court, in Rasul v. Bush, distinguished the Guantanamo detainees
from the Eisentrager detainees, but did not explicitly consider
whether the distinction allows the Guantanamo detainees to claim
a constitutional right to due process. 65
Although the Rasul Court kept the door closed, it did seem to
open a window. The Court's characterization in Rasul of the
United States. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay as a "a territory
over which the United States exercises plenary and exclusive
jurisdiction, but not 'ultimate sovereignty"' and its conclusion that
the circumstances in which the detainees had been held
"unquestionably describe 'custody in violation of the Constitution
or laws or treaties of the United States"' cast into doubt the
assertion that fundamental constitutional protections do not
extend to Guantanamo detainees. 66
A United States territory has an uncommon relationship with
the Constitution. If Guantanamo is in essence equivalent to a
territory, the Constitution may have some application to its
inhabitants. The Court considered the territorial relationship in
62. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 990-91 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
63. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
64. Id. at 785; see also United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259,
269 ("our rejection of extraterritorial application of the Fifth Amendment [in
Eisentrager] was emphatic").
65. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 476 (2004) ("Petitioners in these cases
differ from the Eisentrager detainees in important respects: [t]hey are not
nationals of countries at war with the United States, and they deny that they
have engaged in or plotted acts of aggression against the United States; they
have never been afforded access to any tribunal, much less charged with and
convicted of wrongdoing; and for more than two years they have been
imprisoned in territory over which the United States exercises exclusive
jurisdiction and control.").
66. Id. at 484 (2004) (holding that Guantanamo detainees had a
statutory right to file habeas claims in federal courts).
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Downes v. Bidwell, one of the Insular Cases.67 In Downes, the
Court did not extend all of the protections of the Constitution to
the territory of Puerto Rico, instead upholding a shipping duty
that would not have passed constitutional muster in the United
States.6 8 Nevertheless, the Court suggested that "natural rights,"
including due process, may cover residents of United States
territories. 69  Guantanamo Bay, it will be argued, although
territory-like in important respects, is not Puerto Rico. The
residents of Guantanamo Bay are chiefly United States military
personnel and terrorist suspects imported by the United States,
not an acquired indigenous population. But the situation in which
Guantanamo detainees find themselves perhaps counsels for
greater constitutional application. These are not people governed
by the United States, but prisoners under the absolute unfettered
control of its government.
Similarly, Justice Kennedy, in his concurrence to United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, concluded that a Fifth Amendment
due process right applied to the United States trial of a
nonresident alien arrested in Mexico.70 Kennedy agreed with the
majority that a warrantless search of suspect's Mexican residence
did not violate the Fourth Amendment, 71 but explained his
separate reasoning that the Fourth Amendment could not apply
given the practical exigencies of law enforcement actions in a
foreign country. However, Kennedy explicitly disclaimed the idea
that no constitutional protections extend extraterritorially. 72
Because Fifth Amendment protection attached to the trial of
Verdugo-Urquidez, it would follow that, had evidence been
obtained by unconstitutionally coercive methods, it could not be
introduced into evidence at trial.
In 2005, a district court judge considering multiple habeas
petitions filed on behalf of Guantanamo detainees interpreted the
Supreme Court's decision in Rasul to implicitly confer Fifth
Amendment due process rights upon detainees held at
67. 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
68. Id. at 287.
69. Id. at 283.
70. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
71. Id. at 278.
72. Id.
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Guantanamo Bay.73 Her decision recently was reversed by the
federal appeals court in Boumediene v. Bush, which adhered to
Eisentrager. The constitutional point may be destined for
reconsideration by the Supreme Court.74
INTERPRETING THE MCA IN LIGHT OF THE DTA's PROHIBITION ON
CRUEL, INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING TREATMENT
The MCA's reduced evidentiary test for coerced statements
made prior to the DTA gives military -judges the discretion to
exclude statements that are unreliable or statements that do not
serve the interests of justice. 75 Navy Judge Advocate General
Rear Admiral Bruce MacDonald wrote in a letter to Senator Carl
Levin that military judges should be given the "discretion and
authority to inquire into the underlying factual circumstances and
exclude any statement derived from unlawful coercion, in order to
protect the integrity of the proceeding. ' 76 The MCA, by providing
a discretionary test for the admission of coerced statements, seems
to grant that authority giving military judges the opportunity to
follow Admiral MacDonald's direction to "protect the integrity of
the proceeding. '77
In addition, even if one looks only to reliability and the
interests of justice, the unreliable and unjust nature of coerced
statements should preclude the possibility that evidence of this
73. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 433 (D.D.C.
2005), overruled by Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.D.C. 2007).
74. See Boumediene, 476 F.3d 981.
75. See 10 U.S.C.A. § 948r(d) (West Supp. 2007).
76. 152 CONG. REC. S10,253 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2006) (correspondence
dated Sept. 26, 2006). Admiral MacDonald's sentiments are in line with an
institutional military opposition to torture. Although this ideal is not always
followed in practice, as the torture at Abu Gharaib demonstrated, the ethic
has been demonstrated by the vigorous and vocal defense of' detainees by
their appointed military defense counsel, one military prosecutor's refusal to
prosecute because he believed the defendant had been tortured, and the
Army Field Manual's instruction to interrogators to follow a version of the
"golden rule." See Jess Braven, The Conscience of the Colonel, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 31, 2007, at Al; FM 2-22.3 (FM 34-52), 5-76, Human Intelligence
Collector Operations, Sept. 2006, available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm 2-22-3.pdf ("If the proposed approach
technique were used by the enemy against one of your fellow soldiers, would
you believe the soldier had been abused?").
77. 152 CONG. REC. S10,253 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2006) (correspondence
dated Sept. 26, 2006).
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kind could pass even the MCA's less rigorous test for statements
obtained prior to Dec. 30, 2005.
Only a very narrow class of coerced statements may be
considered reliable, but even if reliable, the test also requires that
admission of the statements serve the interests of justice. Justice
has two implications: that the proceeding results in a correct
outcome (the truly guilty are convicted and the truly innocent go
free) and that the proceeding is fair. 78 A confession wrung from
an accused against his will 79 cannot comport with a fair
proceeding and is therefore unjust.
The MCA's incorporation of the DTA's prohibition of "cruel,
inhuman, or degrading" coercive tactics suggests an additional
interpretation. The DTA's prohibition represents Congress's
decision that "cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment". is antithetical to American ideals and potentially
harmful to American soldiers who may be captured and subjected
to similar treatment.80 The amendment further restricts military
interrogators to only those tactics listed in the Army Field
Manual. 81
Although, the idea that coercive tactics are harmful to
America's image, ideals, and security is not new - given the
judicial history outlined above as well as our international
obligations under the CAT8 2 - Congress felt the need to further
78. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 795 (12th ed. 1968).
79. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 386 (1964) (citing Blackburn v.
Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206-07 (1960)).
80. See Statement of Senator John McCain: Statement on Detainee
Amendments on (1) The Army Field Manual and (2) Cruel, Inhumane,
Degrading Treatment, (Nov. 4, 2005), available at
http://mccain.senate.gov/press-office/viewarticle.cfm?id= 128.
81. Detainee Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 109-148, Title X, § 1002 (2005);
Pub. L. No. 109-163, Title XIV, § 1402 (2006). For more information on the
McCain Amendment see Garcia, supra note 47.
. 82. Statement of Senator John McCain, supra note 80 (McCain states, "If
[the prohibition against cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment] doesn't
sound new, that's because it's not - the prohibition has been a longstanding
principle in both law and policy in the United States"); but see 152 CONG.
REC. S10,250 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2006) (statement of Sen. Graham) (Senator
Graham stated that the reason the MCA does not incorporate the DTA's
prohibition as an evidentiary rule prior to. the passage of the DTA is because
"no one had recognized the 5th, 8th, and 14th amendment concepts applying
to enemy combatants").
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codify the prohibition.83 Any military commission subsequently
allowing coerced confessions to be admitted into evidence would be
continuing the harm Congress set out to stop. While it is true that
the MCA also represents Congress's decision that coerced
confessions obtained prior to enactment of the DTA may not be
subject to the standards of the DTA, this decision comes at a price.
The McCain amendment contains a subsection limiting the
ability of past and future legislation to modify its mandates. The
subsection states, "[t]he provisions of this section shall not be
superseded, except by a provision of law enacted after January 6,
2006, which specifically repeals, modifies, or supersedes the
provisions of this section." The MCA includes the DTA's
prohibition of coercive treatment as an evidentiary restriction, but
does not specifically repeal, modify, or supersede the DTA's
prohibition. A court viewing the MCA evidentiary rule on coerced
testimony this way could, in the interests of justice, extend the
prohibition on "cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment" to
exclude the introduction of coerced statements into hearings
conducted after passage of the DTA. In addition, it seems
contrary to the spirit of the CAT and the DTA to create such an
inequity between the trials of detainees, some of whom may be
convicted based on coerced statements while others are explicitly
protected from introduction of those statements. These
inconsistencies must be remedied, both to ensure the equitable
application of justice and to keep unreliable statements out of the
court room.
CONCLUSION
The shift of power in Congress to a Democratic majority has
spurred political efforts to amend the MCA.84 Whether or not
such efforts are successful, courts will continue their mandate to
oversee the administration of justice. Courts' discretion under the
83. The Torture Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2005), had already codified
the prohibition against torture, but did not further codify restrictions on
"cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment."
84. See News Release, Sens. Dodd, Leahy, Feingold, Menendez Introduce
Bill to Restore Habeas Corpus Rights, Ban Torture, Uphold Geneva
Conventions, U.S. FEDERAL NEWS (Feb. 12, 2007) (discussing the "Restoring
the Constitution Act of 2007," which proposes to exclude all evidence obtained
by coercion and reinstate habeas corpus rights to detainees among other
initiatives).
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MCA regarding evidence obtained by coercion opens at least five
avenues to exclude such evidence in accord with the enduring
values of the law. First, a broad reading of the meaning of
"torture" would categorically exclude evidence obtained by the
worst forms of coercion. Second, a narrow reading of the meaning
of "reliable" would walk in step with traditional judicial
skepticism of coerced confessions. This narrow reading coupled
with a view of "interests of justice" that favors the interest in a
fair proceeding untainted by suspect evidence obtained by coercion
would serve to preclude admission of coerced statements. Third,
courts may apply the minimum "shocks the conscience" standard
to preclude the use of statements procured through coercive
methods that fall short of torture. Fourth, courts can hold that
fundamental rights apply to detainees under the exclusive control
of the United States and exclude coerced statements as
constitutional violations. Fifth, courts can find coerced
confessions contravene the interests of justice and the DTA,
because introduction of coerced statements is an extension of the
harm Congress sought to prevent. Taking any of these paths will
ensure that the United States is traveling in the right direction -
away from the use of torture or coercion to extract evidence in
legal proceedings.
